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TRANSNATIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD JURISDICTION
UNDER SECTION 10(b): THE CASE FOR A FLEXIBLE
AND EXPANSIVE APPROACH
The increasingly internationalized capital market has resulted in a grow-

ing number of securities transactions that possess a transnational character
and, consequently, in increased opportunities for commission of transna-

tional securities frauds.' A transnational securities fraud is a fraudulent
securities transaction that, because it possesses both foreign and domestic
elements, potentially implicates both United States jurisdiction and the
jurisdiction of one or more foreign nations.2 Because transnational securities
frauds arise in a wide variety of factual circumstances, the frauds possess
varying degrees of connection to the United States.3 Transnational securities
frauds' varying degree of connection to the United States presents United

States courts with the issue of determining the amount of United States
connection necessary for a United States court properly to exercise jurisdiction over a transnational securities fraud case.
As indicated, transnational securities frauds encompass a wide range of

factual situations and these fact situations vary considerably in their degree
of connection to the United States. For example, a transnational securities

fraud is most tenuously connected to the United States if the fraud involves
parties foreign in both citizenship and residence, and the sole factor that
provides the fraud with a United States connection is some conduct done
in the United States to further the fraudulent scheme. 4 Transnational frauds

1. See generally InternationalizationReport Sent to Congress by SEC Staff, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1187 (Aug. 7, 1987) (discussing increasing internationalization
of securities markets); Becker, Exporting United States Law: Transnational Securities Fraud
and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 373 (1988)
(same); Note, Barriers to the InternationalFlow of Capital: The Facilitationof Multinational
Securities Offerings, 20 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 81 (1987) (same); Note, SEC Proposals to
FacilitateMultinational Securities Offerings: DisclosureRequirements in the United States and
the United Kingdom, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 457 (1987) (same); Fedders, Policing
Trans-Border Fraud in the United States Securities Markets: The "Waiver by Conduct"
Concept-A Possible Alternative or a Starting Pointfor Discussions? XI BROOKLYN J. INT'L
L. 475 (1985) (discussing potential for fraudulent conduct in increasingly internationalized
securities market).
2. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983) (analyzing as
"transnational" dispute involving allegedly fraudulent securities transaction that potentially
implicates both United States and foreign jurisdiction); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd.
v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 415 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d
109, 110 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977) (same); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519
F.2d 1001, 1004-11 (2d Cir. 1975) (same).
3. See infra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (describing widely varying connections
between transnationa securities frauds and United States).
4. See generally Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1983) (concerning
fraudulent transaction in foreign securities between foreigners in which only connection between
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in which there is United States conduct and one party is a United States
citizen or resident have greater connection to the United States than frauds
for which United States conduct provides the only United States connection.'
The transnational securities frauds with the strongest connection to the
United States are those in which both parties are United States citizens or
residents, and the only foreign element is some contributory fraudulent
6
conduct perpetrated outside the United States.
Although these categories generally describe the different fact situations
that present issues of the transnational scope of the United States securities
fraud laws, each general category is capable of much variation. For example,
frauds in which one or both of the parties possess United States citizenship
7
or residency may involve much different degrees of United States conduct.

transaction and United States was use of United States instrumentalities of interstate commerce
to perpetrate fraud along with some allegedly fraudulent conduct done in United States);
Fidenas, A.G. v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A.,
606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979) (concerning fraudulent securities transaction in which all parties
were foreign and essential core of fraud, including all fraudulent conduct except for secondary
and ancillary aspects, occurred outside of the United States); Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (concerning securities frauds involving foreign
parties but in which some conduct contributing to the fraud occurred in United States).
5. See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 28-29 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(concerning transnational securities fraud that involved foreign plaintiffs and United States
defendant in which United States conduct contributing to fraud did not include all necessary
elements of fraud); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409, 411-13 (8th Cir. 1979) (concerning transnational securities fraud involving foreign plaintiff,
United States defendants, and in which significant amounts of fraudulent and contributory
conduct occurred in United States); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977) (concerning transnational securities fraud in which plaintiff was
foreign, defendants included at least one United States corporation, and in which contributory
United States conduct was significant); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 594 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied (concerning transnational securities fraud involving foreign plaintiff and
United States defendants and in which conduct was done in United States in furtherance of
scheme to defraud plaintiff in connection with plaintiff's purchase of stock of United States
corporation traded on United States stock exchange); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974, 977-81 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (concerning transnational
securities fraud that included both United States citizens or residents and foreigners as both
plaintiffs and defendants and in which United States conduct contributed to fraud); § 10(b)
of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) (requiring plaintiff to allege use
of United States mail or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce to make § 10(b)
securities fraud claim). Because § 10(b) claims must involve use of United States mail or other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, a § 10(b) claim presupposes that the alleged fraud
possesses at least the United States connections inherent in the perpetrator's use of United
States mail or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce to carry out the fraud. Id.
6. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975). The Second Circuit in Bersch said that the United States has jurisdiction
over a transnational securities fraud in which the plaintiffs are United States citizens resident
in the United States, whether or not acts of material importance to the fraud occurred in the
United States. Id. The court did not provide in this context any definition of "act of material
importance". See also infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing Bersch three-part
test for United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds).
7. Compare Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985 n.24 (describing, in transnational securities fraud
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A fraud that involves one or more United States parties and substantial
United States conduct has more ties to the United States than a fraud that
involves one or more United States parties and very little United States
conduct." Transnational securities frauds' varying United States connections,
therefore, present United States courts with the problem of determining
whether a dispute has United States connections sufficient for United States
adjudication, or whether the United States courts should relegate the dispute
to foreign adjudication. 9
United States jurisdiction and adjudication is important to prospective
litigants for several reasons. First, differences in both substance and procedure between United States and foreign securities fraud laws may affect
the outcome.' 0 Second, the existence of United States jurisdiction may be

case involving both United States and foreign plaintiffs and defendants, contributory United
States conduct) with Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 28-29 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(describing United States conduct allegedly contributing to. transnational securities fraud involving United States defendant and foreign plaintiff). In Bersch, the defendants engaged in
various sorts of relevant United States conduct. This conduct included holding numerous
meetings to initiate, organize, and structure the fraudulent securities offering, retaining a
United States law firm and a United States accounting firm to help prepare the offering,
drafting parts of the prospectus and reading parts of the prospectus to a foreign defendant
over the telephone, showing a draft prospectus to the underwriters, and opening United States
bank accounts for receipt of the underwriting proceeds. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985 n.24. In
Zoelsch the relevant United States conduct was limited to preparation of an audit report in
turn quoted in a second audit report distributed abroad to foreigners by the foreign party
actually perpetrating the fraud. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 28-29.
8. Compare United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 836 (1978) (concerning criminal securities fraud case in which defendant was from
United States, defrauded parties were foreign, and contributory fraudulent conduct that
occurred in United States was so substantial that court said analysis of scope of United States
jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds was unnecessary because case was without
question within jurisdiction of United States courts) with Bersch, 519 F.2d at 974 (holding
that United States conduct contributing to fraud, because conduct merely was preparatory,
and thus, was insufficient to support United States jurisdiction over claims by foreign plaintiffs
against United States and foreign defendants).
9. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339 (2d Cir.
1972) (stating that in circumstances in which transnational dispute involves allegations of
conduct in forum nation, forum nation has jurisdiction to displace foreign law and apply
forum nation's law to resolve dispute). Accordingly, the Leasco court stated that international
law principles allow plaintiffs to seek to have United States law control in a transnational
securities fraud case brought in a United States court if the plaintiffs allege that United States
conduct contributed to the fraud. Id.; see also id. at 1344 (discussing possibility of dismissing
transnational securities fraud case under forum non conveniens to allow foreign court to
adjudicate case). The Second Circuit in Leasco emphasized that the decision as to whether to
use forum non conveniens must be based on relative trial convenience of having a case in
foreign, as opposed to United States, courts. Id. The court further noted that when a United
States plaintiff is involved, a United States court should only dismiss under forum non
conveniens in unusually extreme circumstances. Id. (quoting Burt v. Isthmus Dev. Co., 218
F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 922 (1955)).
10. See 3C H. Bloomenthal, SEcURITis AND FEDERAL CoapoRATm LAWS § 15.08 (1989)
(describing foreign securities regulations).
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important if a United States court has, and the alternative foreign courts
lack, personal jurisdiction over a prospective defendant."
Determining the proper scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds requires a two-step analysis. The first step of the
analysis is determining whether the United States has authority to exercise
jurisdiction under international law principles. Under principles of international law, a nation's courts may enact jurisdictional laws only over disputes
in which the forum nation has the requisite interest, as shown by satisfaction
of the conduct or effects test. To meet the conduct or effects test a dispute
must involve either an element of some conduct done within the territory
of the forum nation or an element of some effect felt within the forum
nation.' 2 Accordingly, for international law purposes the United States has
authority to enact jurisdictional laws regarding securities frauds involving
foreign parties if some of the fraudulent conduct was done in the United
States. 3 Similarly, the United States may enact jurisdictional laws covering
securities frauds that, although perpetrated on foreigners not resident within
the United States, nonetheless have some effect within United States territory.' 4 Further, if a party perpetrates a fraud on investors resident in the
United States, then the effect on United States residents constitutes an effect
within United States territory sufficient to satisfy the effects prong of the
international law conduct or effects test, whether or not the defrauded
investors were United States citizens." Therefore, disputes in which the
defrauded investors are United States residents always satisfy international

11. See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(involving plaintiff bringing suit in United States court largely because defendant possessing
considerable assets was subject to United States personal jurisdiction).
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 (1987) (listing elements of international law conduct or effects test). The Restatement
states the international law conduct or effects test as follows: "[A] State has jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to (1) (a) conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its
territory; (b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; (c)
conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory." Id.
13. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (stating that United States may exercise jurisdiction over transnational
securities frauds that involve foreign parties if relevant acts or culpable failures to act occurred
within United States).
14. See supra note 12 (stating international law principle allowing nation to exercise
jurisdiction over dispute within nation's territory) (quoting RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF Tm
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987)); infra notes 40-41, 45, 51, 55,
57-58, 65, 75-77, 80 & 84 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretations of principle
that conduct from within United States allows United States jurisdiction over transnational
securities fraud).
15. See supra note 12 (stating international law principle allowing nation to exercise
jurisdiction over disputes involving effects within territory) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THmni) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF UNITED STATES § 402 (1987)); infra notes 41, 43, 45-47, 61, 7679 and accompanying text (describing judicial interpretations of principle that United States
effects allow United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud).
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law principles, and according to international law, the United States may
exercise jurisdiction over such disputes.
If the circumstances of a transnational securities fraud dispute satisfy
the international law conduct or effects test, and, thus, belong within the
category of disputes over which the United States has authority to exercise
jurisdiction, then a court can proceed to the second step of the analysis.
Under the second step of the analysis, a court must determine whether the
United States actually has enacted a statute with jurisdictional scope sufficient to reach the dispute in question. To pass this second stage of the
jurisdictional test a dispute must satisfy the United States subject matter
jurisdiction requirements. 6 A United States federal court has subject matter
jurisdiction over a dispute that involves an amount in controversy in excess17
of fifty thousand dollars and in which the parties have diverse citizenship.
A federal court also has subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute that
involves an allegation of a violation of a federal statute. 8
Transnational securities fraud disputes typically arise upon allegations
that the defendants violated section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 9 (the 1934 Act) and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
lOb-5 20 (Rule lOb-5). 21 Because claims of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5

16. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972) (stating that Congress does not necessarily intend for United States jurisdiction over
transnational cases actually to extend to broadest limits Restatement allows). The Second
Circuit emphasized in Leasco that the actual transnational extent of United States jurisdiction
in a particular case can be determined only by interpretation of the relevant jurisdictional
statute. Id. The Leasco court stated that satisfaction of the international law conduct or effects
test means only that international law principles do not preclude United States jurisdiction.
Id. at 1335. However, satisfaction of the international law test does not by itself affirmatively
decide the question of whether the United States actually should have jurisdiction over the
dispute. Id.
17. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West Supp. 1990).
18. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1966 and Supp. 1990).

19. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the malls, or of any facility of the
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
20. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mals or any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b)To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
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violations arise under a federal statute, United States federal courts have

subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate any claim that validly alleges the
elements of a section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 violation.22 To determine whether
a transnational secufities fraud plaintiff validly has alleged the elements of
a section 10(b) violation sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction,
courts must determine the extent to which Congress intended the jurisdictional scope of the securities laws to extend over securities frauds that
possess varying degrees of foreign elements. However, statutory analysis of
section 10(b) provides only ambiguous guidance as to the extent that
Congress intended section 10(b) to govern federal securities law violations
that involve foreign elements. 23 The 1934 Act, in general, does not explicitly
discuss transnational securities frauds, in the jurisdictional context or otherwise. 24 Instead, section 10(b) extends United States jurisdiction over any

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
21. See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)); Fidenas AG v.
Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 5-6 (2d
Cir. 1979) (same); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409, 413 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 29 (citing SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1989); Fidenas, 606 F.2d at 5-6 (same); ContinentalGrain, 592 F.2d at 413 (same);
cf. Leasco Data Processing Equip. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating
that in transnational securities fraud context Rule lOb-5 does not affect determination of
subject matter jurisdiction).
22. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing concept of United States
jurisdiction over disputes that involve federal questions); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988) (granting
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under 1934 Act, so that state courts
never can adjudicate such claims).
23. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing § 10(b)'s lack of clear
guidance regarding transnational scope of United States securities fraud laws).
24. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988) (containing no language
regarding scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds); Section 30(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1988) (discussing exemption
from jurisdiction under 1934 Act of persons conducting businesses in securities outside of
United States).
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
Id.
Section 30(b) is not relevant to the discussion of the scope of United States jurisdiction
over transnational securities frauds except inasmuch as its existence buttresses the arguments
for a broad exercise of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud cases. See
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969)
(discussing relevance of § 30(b) to issues of United States jurisdiction over transnational
securities frauds). In Schoenbaum the Second Circuit stated that the only relevance of § 30(b)
of the 1934 Act to the issue of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities is that
the inclusion of the § 30(b) language indicates a general congressional intent that the United
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securities fraud that involves use of the United States mails or other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.Y In addition, section 10(b) governs
frauds that involve stocks not traded on the national securities exchanges
of the United States. 26 Therefore, section 10(b) by itself provides no grounds
for a court to deny United States jurisdiction over a transnational securities
fraud merely because the stock involved in the fraud was not traded on a
United States exchange or, by extension, because the stock involved was
not a United States stock. 27 Thus, because section 10(b) does not explicitly
restrict the scope of jurisdiction, section 10(b) impliedly provides United
States courts with a broad grant of jurisdiction over transnational securities
frauds.
Although the express language of section 10(b) suggests that Congress
intended section 10(b) broadly to cover securities disputes regardless of
whether the disputes have foreign connections, the legislative history of the
1934 Act fails to indicate whether Congress intended United States courts
to have jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds.u Conversely, the
legislative history also fails to indicate that Congress specifically intended
that United States jurisdiction be unavailable in such circumstances.2 9 When

States have jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds. Id. The Second Circuit further
stated that congressional effort to exempt from United States jurisdiction a limited category
of transnational transactions related to foreign businesses in securities supports a presumption
that Congress meant the 1934 Act to apply to all foreign transactions not specifically exempted.
Id.
25. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) (making it
illegal to use United States mail or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce to perpetrate
securities fraud). The United States courts have jurisdiction over all cases brought under the
1934 Act, and thus over all cases brought under section 10(b). 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988). The
1934 Act contains no language that limits United States jurisdiction over securities frauds
beyond the requirement of a use of the United States mail or other instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
26. See § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) (stating
that antifraud provisions also apply to securities not registered on national securities exchange).
Congress did not indicate whether Congress intended § 10(b)'s mention of securities not
registered on a national securities exchange to refer to American over the counter stocks or
to foreign stocks or to both. Id.
27. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir.
1972) (stating that no reason exists for denying United States jurisdiction over transnational
securities frauds merely on grounds that stock involved was not of United States issue); supra
note 19 (indicating that on its face § 10(b) allows United States jurisdiction over transnational
securities fraud whether or not securities involved were traded on United States securities
exchange or issued by United States party) (quoting § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)). But cf. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334 (arguing that it would be
erroneous to assume Congress intended United States jurisdiction to reach full extent that
facial language of United States securities fraud laws allows).
28. See H.R. REP, No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-16 (1934) and S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-13 (1934) (containing no indication that Congress intended 1934 Act to
allow United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds).
29. See supra note 28 (stating that legislative history of 1934 Act does not indicate that
Congress intended 1934 Act not to allow United States jurisdiction over transnational securities
frauds).
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considering the 1934 Act Congress simply did not reach the issue of United
States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds.30
Because Congress did not specifically address the issue, United States
courts must exercise independent judgmbnt to determine, based on the vague
language of section 10(b), the proper extraterritorial scope of the United
States securities fraud provisions.3 Some courts criticize this exercise of
judicial discretion on the grounds that, in making jurisdictional decisions
on the basis of judicial policy objectives, courts inappropriately engage in
judicial legislation. 32 However, because a court must decide whether the
United States has jurisdiction over a transnational securities fraud, without
the benefit of congressional directives, a court cannot avoid articulating a
policy that governs the scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational
securities frauds.3 3 In fact, in response to the lack of congressional policy
30. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (identifying
lack, in legislative history of 1934 Act, of congressional discussion of jurisdictional issues
raised by transnational securities frauds); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific
Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 416 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationae Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A., 604 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1979) (same);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (same);
Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30 (stating that because in 1934 international securities transactions were
infrequent occurrences, Congress did not at time of passage of 1934 Act consider issue of
proper scope of United States jurisdiction over transnationai securities frauds).
31. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
416 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 n.21 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 938 (1977) (noting lack of legislative guidance regarding proper transnational scope
of United States jurisdiction under § 10(b)); Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 29-30 (noting lack of
legislative guidance regarding transnationai scope of United States jurisdiction under § 10(b)
and consequent need for judicial determination); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595
(3d Cir. 1976) (indicating possibility that courts must make jurisdictional decision in transnational securities fraud cases on policy grounds alone); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (indicating need for exercise
of judicial discretion to limit scope of jurisdiction beyond language of § 10(b)); IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334 (same).
32. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (arguing
that courts should not speculate about congressional intent regarding the scope of United
States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds). The District of Columbia Circuit stated
in Zoelsch that other courts' imputation of congressional intent with regard to an issue
Congress never actually considered are attempts to camouflage judicial legislation. Id. Further,
the Zoelsch court stated that courts should leave to Congress any policy decisions regarding
the scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds. Id.
33. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975) (indicating that in many
transnational securities fraud cases, courts must devise test for scope of proper application of
United States securities fraud laws). The Second Circuit in Vencap noted that in the absence
of specific congressional guidance, judicial construction is needed to limit the otherwise very
broad scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational disputes. Id. The Second Circuit
in Vencap emphasized that some method of separating transnational securities fraud disputes
appropriate for United States adjudication from those inappropriate for United States adjudication is necessary if United States courts are to be spared the task of adjudicating disputes
in which the connection between the dispute and the United States is negligible. Id.; see also
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976) (indicating that courts must
somewhere draw line as to extent of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities
frauds).
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regarding section 10b's scope of jurisdiction over transnational securities
frauds, several federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue primarily
4
based their decisions on judicial policy concerns.

Judicial policy concerns regarding transnational securities frauds are
closely related to fact pattern differences, with the factual variations in
transnational securities fraud cases preventing courts from developing a
general rule or standard. The actual facts underlying disputes in which
courts have considered the scope of United States jurisdiction over a
transnational securities fraud vary greatly in terms of the nationality of the
parties and the amount of United States conduct that contributed to the

fraud." Because the cases arise in a wide variety of factual contexts, courts
cannot reach a consensus on a general rule with regard to the federal6
securities laws' jurisdictional scope over transnational securities frauds?
Rather than follow a general standard, courts have decided the jurisdictional
reach of the securities laws on a case specific basis.

7

Because the factual

34. See Grunenthal GmbH V. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasizing
judicial policy rationale for determination of scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc.,
592 F.2d 409, 416 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that in absence of legislative guidance as to extent
of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds, policy considerations have
influenced judicial decisions); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 938 (1977) (stating that courts' decisions as to proper scope of United States
jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds largely must be dependent on policy considerations).
35. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
416 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that judicial decisions as to whether United States has jurisdiction
over transnational securities frauds largely will depend on court's analysis of case-specific
facts). Compare, e.g., Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. dismissed, U.S. -110
S. Ct. 29 (1989) (concerning transnational securities
fraud case in which plaintiff was foreign corporation with small percentage of United States
shareholders, defendants were foreign corporations, and all fraudulent conduct occurred outside
of United States) and Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII
Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1979) (concerning transnational securities fraud case
in which plaintiffs and defendants all were foreign, and United States conduct was involved
in secondary and tertiary aspects of fraud) and Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v.
Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979) (concerning transnational securities fraud
case in which plaintiff was foreign corporation wholly owned by United States corporation,
defendants were from United States, substantial conduct contributing to fraud took place in
United States, but effect of fraud was felt abroad) with Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (concerning transnational securities
fraud case in which defendants included both foreigners and United States citizens or residents,
plaintiff class included both United States residents and foreigners, and United States conduct
contributing to fraud merely was preparatory and much less significant than foreign conduct
contributing to fraud).
36. See infra notes 39-84 and accompanying text (discussing lack of agreement between
federal circuit courts of appeals as to general rule describing scope of United States jurisdiction
over transnational securities frauds).
37. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting case-specific nature
of decisions regarding United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 414 (8th Cir. 1979)
(stating that finding as to jurisdiction depends on analysis of case's specific facts).
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diversity of transnational fraud cases dictates case specific analysis without
the benefit of a general rule the courts must make individual jurisdictional
decisions according to certain broadly articulated policy aims.38 The five
federal circuit court of appeals that have considered cases dealing generally
with these issues have adopted policies that either broadly or narrowly
extend United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud disputes.3 9
The Second Circuit, which frequently considers the proper transnational
scope of the United States securities fraud laws, has developed a policy of
narrowly extending United States jurisdiction over transnational securities
frauds. 4° The Second Circuit derived from the Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States conduct or effects test a basic approach
to analyzing jurisdiction in transnational securities fraud cases. 41 Following
the Restatement, the court looks to the alleged degree of United States
conduct or effects in a given dispute to determine if the United States has
subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. 42 The Second Circuit developed
its conduct or effects-based approach in response to a perceived absence of
explicit statutory guidance as to section 10(b)'s jurisdictional scope over
transnational securities frauds. 43 Accordingly, the Second Circuit developed

38. See infra notes 53-54, 62-71, 78, & 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing policy
aims that federal circuit courts of appeals consider in deciding scope of United States jurisdiction
over transnational securities frauds).
39. See infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text (discussing cases that recognize broad
scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds); infra notes 40-63 and
accompanying text (discussing cases that recognize narrow scope of United States jurisdiction
over transnational securities frauds).
40. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261-63 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989) (adopting narrow policy of extending United States
jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 916-21 (2d
Cir. 1980) (same); Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 8-10 (2d Cir. 1979) (same); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001,
1015-18 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 984-93, 996 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (same); Leasco Data Processing Equip. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1335-37 (2d Cir. 1972) (same); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
200, 207-10 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (same).
41. See Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell
Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1979) (identifying effects within United States and conduct
within United States as exclusive grounds for justifying extension of United States subject
matter jurisdiction over foreign securities activities); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017
(2d Cir. 1975) (same); RESTATEMENT (TmiwD) op THE FORMON RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 (1987) (describing conduct or effects test).
42. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing Second Circuit's analysis of
United States conduct and effects as determinants of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud).
43, See Leasco Data Processing Equip. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972)
(describing language of section 10(b) as "inconclusive" with regard to extraterritorial applicability); Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull
S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 9 (2d Cir. 1979) (identifying lack of statutory guidance with regard to
extraterritorial applicability).
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its own judicial interpretation of the extraterritorial applicability of the
statute."
Under the Second Circuit's approach, a party can premise United States
jurisdiction on either United States effects45 or United States conduct. 6 In

44. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (indicating that because of perceived lack
of statutory guidance as to proper scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational
securities frauds Second Circuit repeatedly has independently outlined general contours of
United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds).
45. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 991 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding United
States conduct unnecessary for United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud if
fraud had direct effect in United States); Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A.,
871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989) (discussing level of
United States effects necessary to allow United States jurisdiction over transnational securities
fraud); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 977-80, 991-93, 1001 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975) (same). In Consolidated Gold Fields the Second Circuit held that there were United
States effects sufficient for United States jurisdiction where United States residents held 2.50
of the shares of the allegedly defrauded plaintiff corporation, the shares had a market value
of approximately $120 million, and the United States effect clearly was a direct and foreseeable
result of the conduct outside the territory of the United States. Consolidated Gold Fields, 871
F.2d at 262. In Vencap, however, the Second Circuit held that the fact that 300 United States
citizens or residents owned some of the securities involved in the fraud, amounting to a total
of approximately .5% of the whole, was insufficient to support United States jurisdiction over
the case. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1017. In Bersch, the Second Circuit held that the fact that 22
persons with United States citizenship or residency held 41,936 shares of the involved securities
was a sufficient United States effect to allow United States subject matter jurisdiction over
the claims of the 22 United States class plaintiffs. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 990-93. However, the
Bersch court further stated that this United States effect was not sufficient to allow United
States subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, sought to be joined in a class action with
those of the United States class plaintiffs, of 50,000 to 100,000 foreign class plaintiffs holding
the bulk of the 11,000,000 outstanding shares. Id. at 996. In addition, the Bersch court held
that generalized effects on the United States securities markets that resulted from the fraudsuch as a loss of investor confidence in American underwriters and in the offshore investment
industry-were an insufficient basis for United States subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 98788.
46. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing subject matter
jurisdiction on basis of United States conduct with regard to securities transactions wholly
consummated in the United States); Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing effect of United
States conduct on jurisdiction decision); Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1001 (2d Cir. 1975) (same);
Bersch, 519 F.2d at 974 (same); Leasco Data Processing Equip. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326
(2d Cir. 1972) (same). In Fidenas the Second Circuit found that the plaintiff's allegation that
a defendant's United States main office was acquainted with a cover-up phase of the fraud
was merely secondary and ancillary to the essential foreign core of conduct constituting the
fraud. Fidenas, 606 F.2d at 5. Accordingly, in Fidenas the Second Circuit held that the
plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient United States conduct to support United States subject
matter jurisdiction, particularly because the alleged United States conduct took only the form
of culpable nonfeasance. Id. In Bersch the Second Circuit found that various preliminary and
ancillary meetings in the United States between underwriters, accountants, and attorneys
involved in the preparation of a fraudulent securities offering carried out abroad involved
insufficient United States conduct to support United States jurisdiction. Bersch, 519 F.2d at
985-87. In Vencap the exact nature of the United States conduct was not clear, thus the
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disputes with no United States effects the Second Circuit requires for
satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirements that United States conduct be

substantial, as opposed to merely preparatory. 47 Similarly, in cases with no
United States conduct the Second Circuit requires that to support
subject
48
matter jurisdiction the United States effects must be substantial.
To determine whether the United States has section 10(b) subject matter
jurisdiction over a transnational dispute, the Second Circuit employs a three-9
4
part test that relates to the international law conduct or effects analysis.
Under the first prong of the Second Circuit's three-part test, the United
States always has subject matter jurisdiction if the plaintiff alleges that
United States citizens resident in the United States were victims of the
fraud, regardless of whether any fraudulent conduct allegedly occurred in
the United States.5 0 Under the second prong, the United States has juris-

diction if the allegedly defrauded parties are United States citizens resident
abroad, but only if significantly contributory United States conduct was
materially important to the fraud.5 1 Under the final prong of the Second

Second Circuit remanded the case for a determination of the role that United States conduct
had played in the fraudulent scheme. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018-21. However, the Second
Circuit emphasized in Vencap that subject matter jurisdiction over a transnational securities
fraud only should be allowed on the basis of substantial United States conduct, in contrast to
situations in which the United States conduct was merely preparatory or was only a small part
of the fraudulent activity. Id. at 1018. The Vencap court also emphasized that the Second
Circuit would not allow United States jurisdiction over transnational securities disputes in
every instance in which some United States conduct was connected to the fraud. Id. In Leasco
the Second Circuit found that the defendant's "abundant" misrepresentations in the United
States and the defendant's making of telephone calls and sending of mail to the United States
were sufficient United States conduct to support United States subject matter jurisdiction.
Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1335.
47. See, e.g., Fidenas, 606 F.2d at 8 (stating that merely ancillary and secondary
fraudulent conduct in United States is insufficient ground for United States jurisdiction);
Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1018 (declining to extend United States transnational securities fraud
jurisdiction so broadly as to allow jurisdiction on basis of mere preparatory activities in United
States); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 210 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
906 (1969) (emphasizing necessity of use of United States mail or other instrumentalities of
interstate commerce for United States court to have jurisdiction over transnational securities
fraud under § 10(b)). But see IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that
while consummation of transnational securities fraud in United States strongly supports United
States jurisdiction, consummation of transnational securities fraud in United States is not
necessarily dispositive of issue whether United States should have jurisdiction over fraud);
Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993 (stating that United States has jurisdiction over transnational securities
frauds in which United States citizens resident in United States were defrauded whether or not
fraudulent acts of material importance occurred in United States).
48. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 255 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989) (requiring that fraud have sufficient effects within
United States to warrant United States jurisdiction).
49. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993 (presenting three-part test for determination of whether
United States subject matter jurisdiction exists over all or part of transnational securities fraud
dispute).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Circuit's three-part test, the United States has no basis for subject matter
jurisdiction if the alleged victims are foreign citizens resident abroad, unless
conduct from within the United States directly caused those plaintiffs'
losses.12 The Second Circuit has stated that, although Congress undoubtedly
never intended that the United States be used as a base for fraudulent
foreign securities schemes conducted abroad,53 it is nonetheless inappropriate
for the United States to expend scarce judicial resources adjudicating cases
54
that involve exclusively foreign plaintiffs, defendants, and transactions.
Thus, the Second Circuit has adopted a policy of narrowly extending United
States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds.
Like the Second Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit narrowly has
construed section 10(b)'s jurisdictional scope over transnational securities
frauds. 55 The primary emphasis of the District of Columbia Circuit's analysis6
has been on the jurisdictional consequences of United States conduct.
With regard to jurisdiction based on United States conduct, the court
characterized the Second Circuit as employing an entirely different test than
the test the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits employ.5 7 The District of
Columbia Circuit understood the Second Circuit to hold that conduct done
within the United States is an adequate basis for United States jurisdiction

52. Id.
53. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) (suggesting that Congress
probably did not intend that United States be used as base for export of fraudulent securities
devices, even if only to foreigners).
54. Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull
S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974,
1001 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (separating claims of United States
citizens or residents from those of foreigners for purposes of determining jurisdiction over
class action). In Bersch the Second Circuit indicated that the United States had jurisdiction
only over claims made by the relatively small number of United States citizens or residents
who were class plaintiffs in the case, and no United States jurisdiction over claims made by
foreigners in connection with the same fraudulent stock offering. Bersch , 519 F.2d at 993,
1001. But see Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989) (allowing jurisdiction over entire securities fraud
case on basis of limited number of United States residents among defrauded parties). In
Consolidated Gold Fields United States residents owned 2.5% of the shares of a foreign
corporation allegedly defrauded in a transnational securities scheme; the Second Circuit stated
that the United States had jurisdiction over the entire case because of the United States
ownership of 2.5% of the plaintiff corporation. Id.
55. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (considering
issue of United States jurisdiction over transnationai securities fraud and declining to find
United States jurisdiction over dispute, largely on policy grounds).
56. See generally Zoesch, 824 F.2d at 28-36 (discussing District of Columbia Circuit's
views on transnationa scope of United States securities laws in dispute containing no allegations
of United States effects and in which court, consequently, did not address consequences of
United States effects on jurisdiction decision).
57. Id. at 30-31; see also infra notes 65, 73-78, 80, 83 & 84 and accompanying text
(discussing tests used by Third Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit for determining scope
of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds).
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only when the conduct is substantial to the fraud g The District of Columbia
Circuit stated that, under the Second Circuit's conduct test, to consider
United States conduct sufficiently substantial to support United States
jurisdiction the plaintiff must allege that the defendant performed in the
United States every one of the elements of a section 10(b) or rule lOb-5
violation. 9 After thus describing the District of Columbia Circuit's understanding of the Second Circuit's test, the District of Columbia Circuit
adopted a narrow jurisdictional policy and a test based on the Second
Circuit's test.60
In adopting the Second Circuit's narrow jurisdictional policy, the District
of Columbia Circuit reasoned that because of the need to conserve United
States judicial resources the Second Circuit's restrictive approach is appropriate. 61 Additionally, the District of Columbia Circuit noted that Congress
never intended the federal securities fraud laws to protect persons other
than United States investors. 62 Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit
concluded that, to preserve United States judicial resources for the adjudication of domestic disputes, United States jurisdiction should extend as
narrowly as possible over transnational securities frauds in the absence of
explicit congressional intent to have United States courts broadly exercise
jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds. 63

58. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30. The District of Columbia Circuit in Zoelsch distinguished
substantial conduct from merely preparatory conduct that did not directly cause the loss
elsewhere. Id. (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992-93 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) for distinction between substantial and preparatory conduct).
59. Id. at 30-31 (citing lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 920-21 (2d Cir. 1980) for idea
that substantial conduct within United States means that conduct including all elements of §
10(b) or rule lob-5 violation took place in United States, although reliance and damages can
occur abroad).
60. Id at 31.
61. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (arguing
that when United States conduct is small part of transnational securities fraud, dispute benefits
of United States adjudication are not great enough to justify expenditure of United States
resources to adjudicate dispute). The Zoelsch court expressed concern that a court, in order
to advance judicial policy goals, deciding to support the broad exercise of United States
jurisdiction under § 10(b) inappropriately would be engaged in legislative action. Id.
62. See id. at 31-32 (noting that sole concern of Congress during debate of 1934 Act
was protection of United States investors and markets) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-16 (1934) and S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-13 (1934)). The District of
Columbia Circuit in Zoelsch stated that during the discussions regarding the 1934 Act Congress
was concerned only with transnational frauds to the extent that the frauds affected United
States investors or markets. Id. at 32. The District of Columbia Circuit emphasized that in
the District of Columbia Circuit's view, when deciding on the 1934 Act Congress never really
considered the possible ramifications of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities
frauds. Id. at 33. In the absence of congressional consideration of the issue of the proper
scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds, the District of Columbia
Circuit argued that the judicial branch cannot appropriately make a policy decision as to how
broadly United States jurisdiction should exist over transnational securities frauds. Id.
63. See id. at 32 (emphasizing District of Columbia Circuit's view that United States
should not expend judicial resources to adjudicate disputes in which United States conduct is
of little relative significance).
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In contrast to the Second and District of Columbia Circuits, the Third
Circuit has adopted a policy of broadly extending United States jurisdiction
over transnational securities frauds. The Third Circuit basically has followed
the Second Circuit's lead in considering United States conduct and effects
as the factors that determine whether the United States has section 10(b)
subject matter jurisdiction over the transnational dispute. 64 However, the
Third Circuit emphasized that policy considerations different from those
the Second Circuit has emphasized largely have influenced the Third Circuit's
decisions recognizing a broad scope of section 10(b) jurisdiction. 6 For
example, in the first of the two instances in which the Third Circuit
addressed the issue, the Third Circuit noted that the defendant was an
American securities dealer. 66 The Third Circuit stated that the United States
has a strong regulatory interest in securities transactions activities of American securities dealers. 67 Specifically, the Third Circuit believed that, because
the United States is responsible for preventing American securities dealers
from engaging in fraudulent securities transactions, United States courts
thereby advancing United
should act to prevent such fraudulent transactions,
6
States interests in the world capital market.
Furthermore, in a separate instance, the Third Circuit expressed concern
that a narrow policy of denying section 10(b) jurisdiction in transnational
securities frauds might encourage persons planning to carry out fraudulent
transnational securities schemes to use the United States as a haven for
their fraudulent operations. 69 The Third Circuit also was concerned that
denying United States jurisdiction might induce, on the part of other nations,
a reciprocal refusal to exercise jurisdiction over transnational securities

64. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977) (couching in terms of United States conduct and United States effects analysis of
propriety of exercise of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud cases);
Straub v. Vaisman and Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d. Cir. 1976) (arguing that conduct within
United States by itself can suffice to support jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud).
But see id. (distinguishing Second Circuit decisions from Straub on basis of significant factual
differences).
65. See Straub v. Vaisman and Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976) (maintaining that
United States' interest in regulating conduct of American securities dealers and in enhancing
world confidence in United States securities markets provides policy basis for broadly extending
United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109,
116 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating that decision about United States jurisdiction over transnational
securities fraud largely must be made on policy grounds).
66. Straub v. Vaisman and Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976).
67. Id.
68. See id. (indicating that United States regulation of United States securities dealers
will enhance world confidence in United States securities market).
69. See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977) (expressing concern that denial of broad United States jurisdiction over transnational
securities frauds might cause United States to become haven for defrauders and manipulators).
The Kasser court suggested that Congress had not intended that the United States become a
"Barbary Coast" harboring international securities pirates. Id.
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70
frauds which involve claims that a party defrauded United States investors.
Finally, the court stated that as a general rule Congress intended the
securities laws to insure the highest standards of conduct in securities
transaction, and that broad allowance of United States jurisdiction promotes
that end.7 ' Thus, based on these policy concerns, the Third Circuit has
adopted a policy of broadly allowing United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds.
Like the Third Circuit, the Eighth Circuit adopted a broad section 10(b)
jurisdictional policy. The Eighth Circuit emphasized that in deciding if
United States courts have jurisdiction over a transnational securities fraud,
a court's decision largely must hinge on the court's analysis of the specific
facts of the case, 72 as influenced by the court's policy beliefs.7 In taking
this approach, the Eighth Circuit concentrated on United States conduct
and effects. 74 Fundamentally, the Eighth Circuit allows jurisdiction on the
basis of conduct if the United States conduct directly caused the loss or
was otherwise fairly substantial. 76 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit allows
jurisdiction on the basis of United States effects that are sufficiently
substantial.7 7 Thus, largely because of the federal securities laws' remedial
purpose, 7 the Eighth Circuit's approach has been to recognize a broad

70. See Kasser, 548 F.2d at 116 (expressing concern that narrow exercise of United States
jurisdiction might result in reciprocally narrow exercise of jurisdiction by foreign nations in
disputes in which United States interests are at stake). The Kasser court stated that a broad,
as opposed to narrow, exercise of United States jurisdiction might encourage foreign nations
to act against parties seeking to perpetrate frauds in the United States. Id.
71. See id. at 116 (stating that Congress intended antifraud provisions of 1934 Act to
insure high standards of conduct in securities transactions).
72. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
414 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that whether court decides United States has jurisdiction over
transnational securities fraud case depends on particular facts of case).
73. See id. at 421 (admitting that Eighth Circuit largely made on policy grounds decision
in favor of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud case).
74. See id. at 413-21 (emphasizing extent of United States conduct and effects in making
jurisdictional analysis); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 520-27 (8th Cir. 1973)
(emphasizing extent of United States conduct in making jurisdictional analysis in dispute
lacking significant allegations of United States effects).
75. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
420 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); IIT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975)) (stating
that United States conduct must be more than merely preparatory and must directly cause
losses in order to support exercise of United States jurisdiction).
76. See Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 525-26 (8th Cir. 1973) (deciding
that United States conduct including two letters, two telephone calls, and sale closing was
substantial enough to support United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud).
77. See Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 417 (stating that United States may establish
jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud by satisfaction of either prong of conduct or
effects test).
78. See id. at 416 n.10 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963) (stating that federal securities statutes have fundamental purpose of creating new,
ethically motivated philosophy of full disclosure in securities transactions).
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range of significant conduct sufficient
to establish subject matter jurisdiction
79
over transnational securities frauds.
Like the Third and Eighth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a
policy of broadly extending section 10(b) jurisdiction over transnational
securities frauds. The Ninth Circuit follows the other circuits in considering
United States conduct and effects as determinants of United States jurisdiction over the transnational disputes. s0 In adopting a fairly broad approach
to the allowance of jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit emphasized its policy
concerns regarding transnational securities fraud perpetrators' use of the
United States as a haven from prosecution.8 ' Also, the court stated that a
policy of supporting a broad exercise of jurisdiction over transnational
securities fraud cases is consistent with Congress' intention that the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws encourage the highest general
standards of conduct in securities transactions. 2 For the Ninth Circuit, the
simple fact that fraudulent conduct occurred in the United States provides
an adequate basis for establishing United States subject matter jurisdiction,
and the fact that the conduct occurred in the United States only by
happenstance is irrelevant to the jurisdiction decision. 83 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit emphasizes that in the context of transnational securities

79. See id. at 421 (stating that fairly inclusive range of significant conduct should allow
United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds).
80. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 423-25 (9th Cir. 1983) (presenting
rule that presence in transnational securities fraud of either United States conduct or United
States effects allows United States jurisdiction over fraud); SEC v. United Fin. Group, 474
F.2d 354, 356-57 (9th Cir. 1973) (same).
81. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing SEC v.
Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977) and Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 421-22) (arguing
that sound policy allows broad United States subject matter jurisdiction over transnational
securities fraud cases, thus discouraging use of United States as base of operation for defrauders
and manipulators).
82. See Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 425 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 186 (1963); Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 421; IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 919
(2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977)) (arguing that Congress intended federal securities statutes to bring about high ethical
standards of conduct in securities industry); Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 135
(9th Cir. 1977) (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied 395 U.S. 906 (1969)) (stating that if courts fail to give United States securities fraud
laws broad transnational effect the courts will thwart Congress' intent that securities legislation
insure maintenance of fair and honest markets) ; Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 425 (suggesting that
broad exercise of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds indirectly may
tend to discourage strictly American securities frauds). The Ninth Circuit reasoned in Grunenthai that, by encouraging American securities professionals to behave responsibly when working
on transnational securities transactions, a broad exercise of United States jurisdiction over
transnational securities frauds prevents American securities professionals from developing
relaxed standards in their transnational work that might spread to the securities professionals'
strictly American work. Id.
83. See Grunenthal, 712 F.2d at 425 (disregarding fact that United States conduct was
merely matter of convenience). For the Grunenthal court, the important consideration was the
fact of United States conduct, rather than the reasons the conduct occurred in the United
States instead of abroad. Id. at 425-26.
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frauds United States territorial limits do not restrict United States jurisdiction.84 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a broad policy of extending
United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds.
As a result, despite the different outcomes that the courts reach, courts
decide largely on policy grounds the fundamental issue of whether the
United States has section 10(b) subject matter jurisdiction over a transnational securities fraud dispute.8 5 Obviously, the courts have identified conflicting policy arguments in support of both a broad and a narrow exercise
of jurisdiction . 6 However, after analysis of the competing interests that
support each policy, United States courts properly should adopt a policy of
broadly allowing United States jurisdiction
over transnational securities
8 7
frauds, subject to minor restrictions.
The arguments that support a broad scope of United States jurisdiction,
such as that adopted by the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, outweigh
for several reasons the arguments to the contrary. 8 First, a broad policy
regarding exercise of jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds prevents
the inconvenience of separating plaintiffs. Courts have difficulty extricating
the claims of foreigners, with few or no connections to the United States,
from the claims of United States citizens resident in the United States.8 9
Because a United States court will have subject matter jurisdiction over the

84. See SEC v. United Fin. Group, 474 F.2d 354, 357-58 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that
United States jurisdiction under 1934 Act is not limited to United States territorial limits).
85. See supra notes 53-54, 62-71, 78, & 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing courts'
reliance on policy considerations to determine jurisdictional scope of United States securities
laws over transnational securities frauds).
86. Compare supra notes 40-63 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have
adopted policy of narrow scope of United States jurisdiction over transnationa securities
frauds) with supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text (discussing courts that have adopted
policy of broad scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 93-100; notes 94-99 and accompanying text
(presenting arguments for, subject to minor restrictions, broad scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds).
88. See infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text (discussing rationale in support of
policy of narrow exercise of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds);
text accompanying notes 89-93 and 100; notes 94-99 and accompanying text (discussing rationale
in support of policy of broad exercise of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities
frauds).
89. See, e.g., Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409, 411, 417 (8th Cir. 1979) (describing situation in which parties disputed whether United
States corporation or only foreign corporation validly made transnational securities fraud
claim). The Ninth Circuit in Continental Grain considered a situation in which the defrauded
party was an Australian corporation. Id. However, the Australian plaintiff was a wholly owned
subsidiary of a United States corporation. Id. at 411. The plaintiff argued that because of the
United States parent corporation's accounting principles, the two corporations were consolidated
to the degree that any financial loss by the Australian subsidiary would be reflected in the
United States parent's accounts. Id. Thus, the plaintiff argued, the fraud victimized a United
States party. Id. at 417. The Eighth Circuit resolved the issue by deciding that because the
parent's loss was indirect the alleged loss by the United States parent was not by itself a
sufficient basis for United States jurisdiction over the dispute. Id. at 417 n.12.
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claims of United States citizens resident in the United States under even a

restrictive jurisdiction test, the court cannot use the lack of sufficient
connection to the United States to avoid adjudicating the claims of United
States citizens resident in the United States. 90 However, courts that use a
narrow jurisdictional test will have to determine which defendants are
sufficiently connected to the United States and which are not. Consequently,
under a broad jurisdictional policy a United States court often will be able
to conserve judicial resources by adjudicating all the claims involved in the
case at once, instead of expending time and effort to decide which claims

to adjudicate and which to dismiss for lack of United States subject matter
jurisdiction. 9' Further, because statutory and legislative sources provide little
guidance on the issue, courts are responsible for deciding the proper extent

of jurisdiction. 92 A United States court that adjudicates a United States
investor's claims should adjudicate the arguably foreign claims as well. If
a United States court follows a policy of narrowly granting jurisdiction,
and accordingly dismisses the foreigners' claims in favor of foreign adjudication, inconsistent outcomes may result. Such inconsistency may undermine faith in the judicial process. 93
Second, international comity principles support the policy of a broad

scope of United States jurisdiction over certain types of transnational
securities frauds. 94 In some situations, for example, personal jurisdiction
considerations may make the United States the only nation able to adjudicate
a particular securities fraud case, even if the fraud did not actually affect
the United States.95 In such a situation, international comity concerns

90. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (applying narrow Second Circuit test and finding jurisdiction over
transnational securities fraud claims brought by United States citizens resident in United States
regardless of whether United States conduct contributed to fraud); supra notes 40 & 44-51
and accompanying text (discussing narrow nature of Second Circuit's test for existence of
United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds).
91. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 990-91, 992 n.43 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (describing difficulty of determining number of United
States purchasers of stock involved in fraud and similar difficulty of determining how United
States persons purchased stock); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1980) (indicating
ambiguity regarding number of United States citizens among defrauded stockholders resident
in United States).
92. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (describing lack of statutory guidance
as to proper transnational scope of United States securities fraud laws).
93. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (indicating significant differences between
United States and foreign securities fraud provisions). But see Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,
519 F.2d 974, 996-97 and n.48 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (indicating
that in special circumstances of class action United States adjudication also could lead to
inconsistent results). The Bersch court noted that because a United States class action judgment
for plaintiff class would lack claim preclusive effect in many foreign courts, the defendant
might be exposed to multiple adverse judgments based on the same cause of action. Id.
94. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONMrCTS § 98 (Supp. 1988) (describing basic principle
of international comity).
95. See United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
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support United States adjudication, on the grounds that in the converse
situation, in which a foreign nation had personal jurisdiction, the United
States would benefit from foreign adjudication of the fraud to protect
96
American interests.
A third argument that supports a policy of a broad scope of United
States jurisdiction is that cases in which plaintiffs seek United States
jurisdiction for the most part will involve defendants in whom the United
States has an interest. A plaintiff will not use section 10(b) to establish
United States jurisdiction unless a United States court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 97 Accordingly, cases arising under section 10(b)
almost always involve defendants that are in some sense American, whether
because the defendants are United States citizens, because the defendants
are United States residents, or because the defendants have some property
or other connection to the United States." If the United States court

836 (1978) (concerning transnational securities fraud in which effects were felt abroad but
perpetrators were located in United States) (citing IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017
(2d Cir. 1975)). The Cook court emphasized the importance of preventing fraudulent international securities operators from using the United States as a haven, a situation the court
considered a possible result of United States courts' failure to exercise jurisdiction over
transnational securities frauds that United States residents perpetrated. Id.
96. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that United
States would not approve of foreign nation declining to exercise jurisdiction to prevent parties
resident in foreign nation from defrauding United States investors). The Second Circuit in
Vencap stated that because it is in the United States' interest for foreign nations to exercise
jurisdiction when such exercise is necessary to protect United States parties from transnational
securities frauds, Congress must have intended the United States securities laws to be used to
protect foreigners in certain circumstances. Id.
97. See J. MooRE, A. VEsTAL, & P. KU.ND, MooRE's MANUAL § 6.01 (1989) (stating
that court rpust have personal jurisdiction over defendant in order to properly adjudicate case).
98. See, e.g., Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, 871 F.2d 252, 255 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989) (involving only foreign corporations as defendants
but in which foreign defendants own 29.9% of corporation with $1.2 billion in United States
assets and thus have significant connection to United States); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 824 F.2d 27, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (involving United States corporation as defendants);
IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 913 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving United States defendant); Fidenas
AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5,
6 (2d Cir. 1979) (involving defendants that include subsidiary of United States corporation);
Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc,, 592 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir.
1979) (involving United States corporation and United States citizen resident in United States
as defendants); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977) (involving corporation incorporated in United States or at least maintaining offices in
United States as defendant); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 594 (3d Cir. 1976)
(involving United States brokerage firm and United States citizen resident in United States as
defendants); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1004 (2d Cir. 1975) (involving defendants
including United States citizen); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (involving United States banks as defendants); SEC
v. United Fin. Group, 474 F.2d 354, 355 (9th Cir. 1973) (involving United States corporation
as defendant); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 518 (8th Cir. 1973) (involving
as defendants only foreign corporations but in which foreign defendants own subsidies in
United States and conduct business in United States and so have significant connection to

1990]

TRANSNA TIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD

determines that the plaintiff has not adequately alleged personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, the court can dismiss on that ground without even
reaching the subject matter jurisdiction issue. 99 Accordingly, a United States
court need never reach the issue of whether the United States has subject
matter jurisdiction over a transnational securities fraud in any case that
lacks the substantial connection between the United States and the defendant
necessary for the United States to have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.100
Proponents of a narrow policy propose two arguments against a broad
scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds. First,
proponents of a narrow policy claim that a broad exercise of United States
jurisdiction over basically foreign securities frauds leads to undue strain on
United States courts because United States courts will have to adjudicate
many cases in which, because of the cases' tenuous connection to the United
States, the United States has little interest.'," Additionally, the narrow policy
proponents argue that if United States courts broadly exercise jurisdiction
over transnational securities frauds, United States courts in effect become
open forums readily available to foreigners for adjudication of foreign
securities fraud disputes. Thus, proponents of a narrow jurisdictional policy
claim that a broad policy forces the United States to squander scarce judicial
0 2
resources on fundamentally foreign disputes.
United States); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333 (2d
Cir. 1972) (involving defendants having offices in United States); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (involving United States
corporations as defendants and in which fraud concerned stocks traded on United States
securities exchanges). But see Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 422 (9th Cir. 1983)
(involving only foreign citizens and corporations as defendants). Although the defendants in
Grunenthal possessed no significant connections to the United States, the Ninth Circuit held
that the United States had jurisdiction over the case because significant conduct contributing
to the fraud occurred in the United States. Id. at 425-26.
99. See J. MooRE, A. VasTAL. & P. KtuR.Am, MooRE's MANuAL § 6.01 (1989) (stating
that even if court has subject matter jurisdiction it cannot issue valid decision in absence of
personal jurisdiction).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 103-104; notes 105-107 and accompanying text
(explaining why broad scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds
will not cause United States courts to adjudicate cases totally lacking in significant United
States connections).
101. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (arguing
that United States has limited interest in adjudicating merely on basis of small amount of
United States conduct transnational securities fraud with primarily foreign character); Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975)
(noting difficulties United States court would face in trying to adjudicate foreign securities
fraud claims as part of class action).
102. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985) (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975) (noting courts' concern that United States judicial resources most appropriately
are preserved for adjudication of disputes of significant interest to United States)); Fidenas
AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5,
10 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding it improper for United States to expend judicial resources adjudicating
transnational securities fraud in which only United States connection was culpable nonfeasance
occurring in United States).
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However, the proponents of a narrow jurisdictional policy incorrectly
argue that a broad approach to United States jurisdiction will result in the
undue burden of requiring United States courts to adjudicate fundamentally
foreign disputes. First, the requirements for a cause of action under section
10(b) prevent plaintiffs from bringing under section 10(b) cases that contain
no connection whatsoever to the United States. Section 10(b) requires
plaintiffs to allege that the defendants used United States mails or other
United States instruments of interstate commerce as mechanisms to further
the fraudulent scheme.103 Thus, if the plaintiff's allegation is correct, the
defendant's use of the United States mails or other instruments of interstate
commerce to perpetrate a securities fraud necessarily gives the fraud some
degree of connection to the United States.10 Consequently, in contrast to
narrow policy proponents' assertions, a broad exercise of United States
jurisdiction does not lead to United States courts adjudicating cases with
only a tenuous connection to the United States.
Furthermore, proponents of a narrow jurisdictional policy incorrectly
postulate that a broad jurisdictional policy results in use of the United
States courts as general forums for the adjudication of foreign securities
fraud disputes, because a United States court can hear a case only if the
United States court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant 05 Because
a defendant must possess certain connections to the United States for the
United States to have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the personal
jurisdiction requirement assures connections between the United States and
the dispute.' ° 6 The United States has a legitimate interest in preventing
parties within the reach of United States personal jurisdiction from conducting securities fraud schemes, even on foreigners.'0 Therefore, a United

103. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (indicating that § 10(b) requires that
plaintiff allege use of United States mails or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce to
make securities fraud claim under § 10(b)).
104. See supra notes 16 & 19-20 (indicating that United States securities laws prevent
United States courts from having jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud if fraud
involves no United States conduct whatsoever, even if one or both of parties is United States
resident or citizen).
105. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1327, 1339 (2d Cir.

1972) (noting requirement that court have personal jurisdiction over defendant to adjudicate
case).
106. See generally Smith, No Forum at All or Any Forum You Choose: Personal
Jurisdiction Over Aliens Under the Antitrust and Securities Laws, 39 Bus. LAW. 1685 (1984)
(discussing personal jurisdiction requirements and consequences in transnational securities fraud
context). Smith states that the exact nature of the 1934 Act's personal jurisdiction requirements
are ambiguous. Id. at 1695-96. However, Smith also states that, for the United States to have

personal jurisdiction a defendant clearly must have contacts with the United States, either in
the form of contacts with the nation as a whole (national contacts) or in the form of contacts
with the forum state. Id. at 1701-04.
107. See Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983) (indicating United
States interest in adjudicating fraud involving entirely foreign victims because assertion of
United States jurisdiction would discourage United States securities professionals engaged in
transnational work from developing relaxed standards possibly spilling over into work on
United States transactions); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc.,

1990]

TRANSNA TIONAL SECURITIES FRAUD

States court appropriately should exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a

dispute in which a party subject to United States personal jurisdiction
allegedly perpetrated a fraudulent scheme.
The second argument that proponents of a narrow policy raise against

a broad scope of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities
frauds is that if United States courts exercise jurisdiction over disputes that
involve mostly foreign persons and foreign conduct, the United States is

likely to violate international comity principles. 18 However, the comity
argument fails to recognize the United States securities fraud laws' own
jurisdictional limitations. Any dispute that falls within the scope of section
10(b) necessarily meets the international law principle of objective territorial
jurisdiction, which is the conduct prong of the conduct or effects test.1° 9
Section 10(b) claims always meet the conduct prong of the conduct or

effects test because the necessary allegation that the perpetrator of the fraud
used the United States mails or other instruments of interstate commerce
in the perpetration of the fraud 110 is always an allegation of conduct in
the United States.'1

592 F.2d 409, 421-22 (8th Cir. 1979) (recognizing United States interest in adjudicating fraud
that involves entirely foreign victims both because of risk of causing unfavorable reciprocal
responses by foreign nations and because of benefits of encouraging effective international
antifraud enforcement); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 938 (1977) (arguing that Congress intended that United States courts use United States
securities fraud laws to protect foreigners); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d
Cir. 1976) (indicating United States interest in preventing United States securities dealers from
perpetrating fraud on anyone, foreign or otherwise); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017
(2d Cir. 1975) (arguing that Congress intended that United States not be used as base for
export of fraudulent securities to foreigners because of foreign reciprocity considerations). But
see Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that Congress
intended United States securities fraud laws to be used only to protect United States plaintiffs).
108. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 263 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989) (discussing international comity issues raised by
exercise of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud). In Consolidated Gold
Fields the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief supporting United States jurisdiction over the
transnational securities fraud but also suggesting that the Second Circuit direct the trial court
to abstain from granting a remedy on the grounds that granting a remedy necessarily would
violate international comity principles. I1d. The Second Circuit agreed that the United States
had subject matter jurisdiction. Id. However, rather than follow the SEC's suggestion with
regard to a remedy, the Second Circuit directed the trial court to conduct additional fact
finding to determine if the trial court could fashion any remedy consistent with international
comity principles. Id. Thus, the Consolidated Gold Fields court ordered the trial court to
grant a remedy only if the trial court found it possible to devise a remedy that would not
violate international comity principles. Id.
109. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
416 (8th Cir. 1979) (quoting Note, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antifraud Provisions
of the Securities Acts, I1 CoR U ITrr'L L. J. 137, 139 & nn.12-16 (1978)) (equating conduct
prong of conduct or effects test with objective territorial principle).
110. See supra note 19 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)) (indicating that § 10(b) requires
use of United States malls or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in all claims
brought under § 10(b)).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 103 & 104 (explaining that use of United States
mails or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce necessarily entails United States conduct).
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However, even though section 10(b) claims always meet the conduct or
effects test, comity considerations still may prevent United States courts
from fashioning an effective remedy.1 2 In situations in which comity considerations prevent a United States remedy, a United States court need not
deny United States jurisdiction solely on the grounds that the court cannot
impose a remedy consistent with international comity." 3 Exercising jurisdiction over the dispute allows the court definitively to establish that no remedy
consistent with international comity is possible.11 4 If the court after comprehensive proceedings determines that the court cannot fashion a remedy
consistent with international comity, then the court can decline to impose
any remedy." 5 By broadly exercising jurisdiction, and then when appropriate
declining to impose a remedy, courts prevent the ambiguity that otherwise
exists if courts merely premise denial of jurisdiction on a plaintiff's bare
allegations that a United States court will be unable to fashion a remedy
consistent with international comity. Thus, United States courts can enforce
a broad scope of jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds without
violating principles of international comity.
The diversity of fact situations that comprise transnational securities
frauds renders extremely complex the issue of the proper scope of transnational jurisdiction under the United States securities fraud laws." 6 In
deciding whether the Untied States has jurisdiction over a transnational
securities fraud, United States courts must determine whether the dispute's

112. See Consolidated Gold Fields, 871 F.2d at 263 (discussing possibility of comity
considerations preventing United States court from fashioning effective remedy in transnational
securities fraud case). The Second Circuit in Consolidated Gold Fields stated that, as a settled
principle of both United States and international law, a United States court should avoid
taking any remedial action with an extraterritorial effect so disproportionate to the United
States harm sought to be remedied that the remedial action would violate international comity
principles. Id.; see also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207-08 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (discussing Congress' intent that United States avoid involvement
in futile attempts to impose United States securities laws on person outside of reach of United
States sanctions).
113. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 263 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989) (allowing United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud even in absence of showing that remedy consistent with international
comity is possible).
114. See id. (indicating need, following full trial on merits, for additional factfinding to
determine if remedy consistent with international comity principles exists).
115. See id. (directing trial court to decline to impose remedy if remedy consistent with
international comity is not possible).
116. See Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
414 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating that in determining whether United States has jurisdiction over
transnational securities fraud, court should not consider dispositive any one factor previously
considered significant in determining whether United States had jurisdiction over earlier
transnational securities fraud case); Fidenas AG v. Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique CII Honeywell Bull S.A., 606 F.2d 5, 6 n.2 (quoting Venture Fund (Int'l) N.V. v.
Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)) (discussing difficulties in
making jurisdictional determinations at preliminary stage of proceedings because of disputed
or ambiguous facts).
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connection to the United States is sufficient to support United States subject
matter jurisdiction over the dispute.1 1 7 In the absence of congressional
directives, courts have analyzed the degree of United States conduct and
effects in a particular case to determine if the United States has jurisdiction
over the dispute."'
Because no strict test exists to determine when the United States properly
has jurisdiction over a transnational securities fraud, courts rely on policy
considerations to inform their jurisdictional decisions." 9 The federal circuit
courts that have considered the issue have developed two basic policies. The
first policy favors a broad extension of United States jurisdiction over
transnational securities frauds, on the grounds that courts should strive to
prevent the United States from becoming a haven for persons that perpetrate
fraudulent securities schemes. 20 The second policy favors a narrow allowance
of United States jurisdiction, on the grounds of protecting United States
courts from squandering scarce judicial resources adjudicating disputes in
which the United States possesses only tenuous interest.' 2,
Because of the range of factual variation presented, a bright line test
for United States jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud disputes
remains elusive. However, this very factual variation argues for the necessity
of maintaining flexibility, and flexibility to deal with a wide variety of fact
situations cannot exist if courts employ narrowly restrictive jurisdictional
tests.

ERic D. PETERSON

117. See supra notes 39-83 and accompanying text (discussing judicial analysis of United
States subject matter jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds in terms of frauds'
connections to United States).
118. See supra notes 41-52, 56-60, 64, 72-79 & 83 and accompanying text (discussing
judicial analysis of United States conduct and effects as determinants of United States subject
matter jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds).
119. See supra notes 53-54, 62-71, 78 & 81-82 and accompanying text (identifying courts'
reliance on policy considerations in determining whether United States jurisdiction exists over
transnational securities frauds).
120. See supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text (discussing policy of broad exercise of
United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds).
121. See supra notes 40-63 and accompanying text (discussing policy of narrow exercise
of United States jurisdiction over transnational securities frauds).

